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Abstract In this brief response to Etzioni’s paper we argue
that satisfying one’s preferences and seeking to live up to
one’s moral standards are not incompatible ways of living
one’s life, and that choosing to act morally need not involve
self-sacrifice.
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Etzioni’s interesting article starts with the contrast between
satisfiers, who only care for their own happiness and act to
maximise their pleasure and minimise their pain, and
affirmers, who seek to live in accordance with their moral
values. In the rest of the article, Etzioni argues that human
nature is characterised by a constant wrestling between satis-
fying one’s desire for happiness and honouring one’s moral
commitments. As what people want to do is heavily condi-
tioned by the society they live in, Etzioni suggests that, for the
common good, people should be encouraged, or better, social-
ly conditioned, to pursue affirmation over satisfaction. This is
because human agents are naturally motivated to pursue hap-
piness but find it harder to be motivated to honour their moral
commitments.
We find the initial contrast between selfish happiness-
seeking agents and selfless virtue-seeking agents unconvincing.
The distinction between the quest for happiness and the quest
for morality drawn by Etzioni is a fairly modern and contested
one. For example, Aristotle’s eudaimonia can famously be
translated both as happiness and as flourishing. Clearly, there
are historical precedents for seeing themorally good life and the
happy life as one and the same.
What agents want, ultimately, is to satisfy their preferences.
Some of such preferences are about states of affairs that bring
agents pleasure. It is not a surprise that most human agents
care about gaining recognition, enjoy a good meal, take pride
in their own achievements and in those of their partners, off-
springs, and friends. Other preferences are about states of
affairs that do not necessarily bring agents pleasure in the short
term. Typically, human agents strive to be the type of person
they would like themselves to be, and want to make the world
around them closer to the world they would like to live in.
Some of what it is for agents to fulfil their moral commitments
can be identified with the satisfaction of preferences in this
latter category: agents may want to be more altruistic and
compassionate, or they may want their society to be fairer
and more inclusive, and the measures they take to fufil such
goals may not bring immediate pleasure.
But this does not rule out that some of an agent’s moral
commitments can be furthered by satisfying preferences in
the former category: just because agents take pleasure
from the satisfaction of some of their preferences, this
does not mean that satisfying those preferences is de-
prived of moral significance or does not further their mor-
al aims. Take the pleasure that a mother gets from her
son’s good academic performance. Her preference for
her son to do well may have been an important factor in
motivating her to act in a number of selfless and helpful
ways, such as supporting her son at difficult times, and
putting his interests before her own. Whether or not she
gets pleasure from his achievements, the fact that she
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wanted him to achieve and helped him to do so is morally
significant.
One way of characterising the aspect of human nature
Etzioni focuses on in his article is to acknowledge that typical
agents are individuals who have a variety of preferences. But
Etzioni cautions against describing both the pursuit of plea-
surable experiences and the fulfilment of moral commitments
as preference satisfaction, for several reasons. Etzioni is con-
cerned that, if we talk about preference satisfaction in both
cases, the motivation to fulfil moral commitments may be
reduced to a self-serving one, also aimed at maximising plea-
sure, but in a less direct way (e.g., the son who diligently takes
care of his aging father does so not out of genuine compassion
and concern for his father, but because by doing so he feel
better about himself).
The worry is that the reduction would be wildly implausi-
ble, because fulfilling moral commitments involves consider-
able self-sacrifice. This matters to Etzioni’s final recommen-
dations: his view is that, given that affirmation typically in-
volves pain, it Btends to decay if left to its own devices^,
whereas the satisfaction of hedonistic preferences preserves
its strength through time. Thus, Etzioni argues in the end that
society should intervene to support affirmation. In what fol-
lows, we suggest that the psychological mechanisms respon-
sible for affirmation and for the pursuit of hedonistic prefer-
ences are znot obviously distinct, and that the motivation for
affirmation can be effectively sustained by the desire to pre-
serve and enhance a positive concept of oneself as a unified,
coherent, and causally efficacious agent.
Is it Implausible to Characterise Affirmation
as a Form of Satisfaction?
Etzioni's worry is that if we see morality as just another kind of
desire satisfaction we take away what is distinctly moral about
morality. This is a recurring topic. If we talk about affirmation
in terms of preference satisfaction, aren’t we reducing moral
ambitions to an ultimately pleasure-seeking and self-serving
strategy? The thought Etzioni articulates here is that all altru-
istic behaviour is basically selfish. If doing good to others
gives agents pleasure and ignoring the need of others is pain-
ful to agents, then agents only act morally because it makes
them happy.
One of the most elegant refutations of the claim that Bif
doing what is good makes one happy and acting immorally
makes one unhappy, then all moral actions are selfish^ has
been provided by David Hume. He argues that, in order for
one’s doing good to others to have a positive effect on one’s
well-being, one first needs to value the wellbeing of others.
That is, the selfish pleasure one gets from doing good to others
is contingent on one’s altruistic motivations.
There are mental passions, by which we are impelled
immediately to seek particular objects, such as fame,
or power, or vengeance, without any regard to inter-
est; and when these objects are attained, a pleasing
enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of our in-
dulged affections. (…) Were there no appetite of any
kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could
scarcely ever exert itself, because we should, in that
case, have felt few and slender pains or pleasures and
have little misery or happiness to avoid or pursue.
(Hume 1998, EPM, Appendix 2, SBN 301).
It follows that we can concede that even if one fulfils
moral goals as part of satisfying one’s preferences, this
does not make altruistic preferences selfish in any
meaningful sense. Rather, agents need to care about
doing the right thing to derive some satisfaction from
it. The selfish motivation piggybacks on the altruistic
motivation.
Importantly, this account does not only apply to moral
behaviour. As Hume points out, many things are pleasurable
to agents because agents value them, and would not be
pleasurable to them if they did not value them. He illustrates
this using the example of the desire for fame. BNature must, by
the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an
original propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from
that acquisition.^ (Hume 1998, EPM, SBN 301) This shared
feature of moral and non-moral preferences undermines the
claim that there is a special problem with talking about moral
goals as preferences.
It is not obvious that the psychological mechanisms behind
satisfying hedonistic preferences are distinct from those that
motivate people to satisfy their moral preferences. For exam-
ple, there is evidence that performing altruistic acts, such as
giving to charity, recruits the same brain areas associated with
rewarding experiences, such as receiving a financial reward.
(cf. Moll et al. 2006) The hypothesis that agents experience
pleasure when they perform a moral action is consistent with
the point Etzioni himself makes, when he discusses the em-
pirical studies showing that performing altruistic acts such as
volunteering is perceived as rewarding. Furthermore, as
outlined in our initial example, there are many cases where
hedonistic and moral preferences are not in competition. This
brings us to Etzioni’s central claim that acting morally in-
volves pain.
Does Affirmation Typically Involve Pain?
Etzioni appears to be suspicious of people who enjoy doing
good things. He says that "activities that serve higher needs
may be prosocial but nevertheless tend to be amoral". We take
it that he has two reasons for making this claim. One is the
270 Soc (2016) 53:269–272
selfishness objection discussed and dismissed above.1 The
other is his claim that acting morally typically involves pain.
Is it true that pursuing happiness involves maximising plea-
sure whereas fulfilling moral commitments involves sacrifice?
We will argue that a) living up to one’s moral standards is not
always painful, and that b) there are non-moral self-realisation
goals which also require painful sacrifices. Consequently,
moral goals and preferences do not differ from non-moral
ones in a principled way.
One example Etzioni offers for moral action that requires
sacrifice is the case where someone, call her Jill, would like to
go see a movie but ought to visit a friend in hospital. In this
case, there is indeed a sacrifice to be made. But assume that
the Jill’s desire to visit her ill friend is stronger than her desire
to see a movie. In that case, Jill’s inclination and her duty
coincide. Absent a further argument, it would seem petty to
claim that the her act is any less moral just because she also
enjoys it. Taken together with the empirical evidence that peo-
ple find doing what they perceive to be morally right reward-
ing, this example shows that painfulness may be a feature of
moral conduct, but it does not need to be.
Furthermore, one may also make sacrifices to satisfy a non-
moral preference. Think of the following scenario: Tim ought to
go to the gym, but he would like to stay on the couch and eat
chocolate. The ‘ought’ in the sentence above is not a moral
ought, it is an ought that is contingent on Tim’s goals such as
staying healthy, controlling his weight, and so on. Just as in the
case of the moral sacrifice, Tim may not enjoy the gym much,
but still gets a warm glow of satisfaction after completing his
goal. Again, the contrast between satisfyingmoral and non-moral
goals is much less pronounced than Etzioni makes it out to be.
But maybe the difference is best understood as one of de-
gree. After all, Etzioni claims that living up to one’s moral
commitments is typically painful, not that it is always painful.
While there is room to argue that realising one’s moral goals
requires no bigger sacrifice than realising ambitious self-
actualization goals (such as writing a novel or climbing mount
Everest), it is indubitably the case that living up to one’s moral
standards frequently does require one to sacrifice some other
interest. What is more, it is the costliness of moral action that
frequently leads one to fall short of one’s moral ideals. There is
a significant body of research, both in the literature on positive
illusions and in that on situationism, which shows that people’s
moral self-image is unduly positive (Brown 2012; Sedikides,
Meek, Alicke, and Taylor 2014). People overestimate the pow-
er of their good intentions and underestimate the force of situ-
ational factors that make doing the right thing costly, either
because doing the right thing is inconvenient or for some other
reason (Dunning 2004; Epley and Dunning 2000; Tenbrunsel,
Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, and Bazerman 2010).
Supporting Moral Preferences and Conduct
Is it plausible that the motivation to pursue hedonistic prefer-
ences sustains itself whereas the motivation to pursue moral
preferences is destined to fade if not incentivised by the state
or society? Etzioni claims that affirmation is integral to human
nature and section 5 of his paper, which reviews evidence of
systematic affirming behaviour, shows that affirming behaviour
is fairly robust. Moreover, one's desire to preserve a positive
and largely coherent concept of oneself may be instrumental to
avoiding acting in ways that would violate one's moral commit-
ments. However, specific moral norms may be culture-relative
or even depend on the individual’s set of values.
We take both Etzioni’s article and our discussion to show
that the desire to act morally is part of the normal human
psychological make-up. Because moral conduct does fre-
quently require sacrifices, agents may fall short of their moral
ideals. More worryingly, due to positive illusions and the ten-
dency to see themselves in an unrealistically positive light,
people may not even notice that their behaviour does not
match their moral standards, or they may be unrealistically
optimistic about the likelihood of them doing what is right.
It is in helping agents to live up to their moral standards that
the state or society has a role to play in incentivizing moral
conduct, and in disincentivizing immoral and criminal behav-
iour. The significance of the intervention of the state or society
can be seen in Etzioni’s example of people who were
interviewed about their propensity to commit illegal acts.
They refrained from committing crimes both for moral rea-
sons and in order to avoid negative repercussions. Social sanc-
tioning is indeed a powerful source of motivation.
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